The effects of amount of prior information, source expertise, and source discrepancy on belief change. by Holmes, William H.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1976
The effects of amount of prior information, source
expertise, and source discrepancy on belief change.
William H. Holmes
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Holmes, William H., "The effects of amount of prior information, source expertise, and source discrepancy on belief change." (1976).
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1460.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1460

THE EFFECTS OF AMOUNT OF PRIOR INFORMATION,
SOURCE EXPERTISE, AND SOURCE DISCREPANCY ON
BELIEF CHANGE
A Dissertation Presented
By
WILLIAM H. HOLMES
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1976
Psychology
0 William H. Holmes
All Rights Reserved
iii
THE EFFECTS OF AMOUNT OF PRIOR INFORMATION,
SOURCE EXPERTISE, AND SOURCE DISCREPANCY ON
BELIEF CHANGE
A Dissertation Presented
by
WILLIAM H. HOLMES
Approved as to style and content by:
Icek k^zen/ Chairperson of Committee
Alice H. Eagly, Member ^
^
Richard A. Damon, Jr., Outside /lember
Bonnie R. Strickland, Head
Department of Psychology
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To Drs. Icek Ajzen, Richard Damon, Alice Eagly, and Sandy
Pollatsek, I am indebted for their invaluable guidance during the
initialization and completion of the dissertation. To Kim Skelly,
my thanks for the typing of the final draft. To Roger Garthwaite and
Bob Vincent, my appreciation for their technical assistance. And to
my wife, Joan Dalton, my fellow graduate students (especially Dave
King, Sue Lehtinen, and Dorit Sejwacz) , and to my own students
(notably Tony Dubitsky, Rob Kaminoff, and Lesley Pease), a special
thank-you for their encouragement and moral support.
VABSTRACT
The Effects of Amount of Prior Information,
Source Expertise, and Source Discrepancy On
Belief Change
(September, 1976)
William H. Holmes, B.S., University of Massachusetts,
M.S., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Icek Ajzen
In a test of Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) model of probability of
acceptance and belief change, subjects formed initial beliefs on the
basis of varying amounts of information in one of two situations. In
the student situation, subjects estimated the chances that each of a
set of high school Seniors would be accepted into a mid-western state
university. In the film situation, subjects estimated the chances that
each of a set of French films would be shown in the United States. In
either situation, initial opinions were based upon two, four, or six
pieces of information. Following exposure to variously discrepant
opinions of variously expert sources, subjects indicated their final
opinions
.
Belief change was measured by taking the algebraic difference
between initial and final opinions. Following Fishbein and Ajzen (1975),
probability of acceptance was estimated by dividing the amount of change
obtained by the amount of change advocated, i.e. relative change. As
expected, in the student situation, a main effect of discrepancy and its
interactions with prior information and perceived source expertise were
obtained. However, in the film situation, the discrepancy main effect
and its interaction with information were significantly weaker while
expertise had no effect. These latter results were attributed to the
vl
greater perceived informational value of the cues upon which Initial
film beliefs were based. Finally, disconfiming Fishbein and Ajzen's
conceptualization, relative change scores proved to be only a rough
Index of probability of acceptance. Implications are discussed.
vli
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgments
Abstract
V
List of Tables
viii
List of Figures
^
Introduction
2^
Method
Design
Subjects
2,5
Materials 15
Procedure ig
Results 24
Manipulation checks 24
Belief change and relative change 29
Overall facilitation 43
Goodness of fit 50
Discussion 52
Belief change 52
Relative change and probability of acceptance 54
Implications for change along other dimensions 55
References 57
Appendices 61
A. "Practice" profiles and response scale for student
situation 62
B. Communication phase profiles for student situation 66
C. Source opinion and response scales for student
situation 69
D. "Practice" profiles and response scale for film
situation 72
E. Communication phase profiles for film situation 76
F. Source opinion and response scales for film situation 79
G. Levels of each cue used in each profile of each
situation 82
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table
Page
1 Proportion of Total Variance in Initial 25
Proximal Probabilities Accounted for by
Each Cue in the Six-cue Condition of
Each Situation
2 Mean Control and Post-experimental Ratings 28
of, and Changes In, Source Expertise for
Each Situation as a Function of Source
3 Linear Regression Coefficients for Each 33
Situation as a Function of Cue Number
4 Mean Perceived Expertise Scores 39
5 Partial Analysis of Variance Summary Table 41
for Cue Number by Perceived Expertise
Analysis On Belief Change
6 Mean f_ Levels as a Function of Cue Number 47
and Situation
7 Mean f^ Levels for Student Situation as a 48
Function of Perceived Source Expertise
8 Average Intra-cell Correlations Between 51
Predicted and Obtained Values of Probability
of Acceptance
Ix
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Family of acceptance gradients for 9different degrees of facilitation
2 Change in advocated direction as a 12
function of discrepancy and acceptance
gradients with varying f^ values
3 Belief change as a function of source 3I
discrepancy
4 The relationship between discrepancy and 32
belief change as mediated by cue number
5 Relative change as a function of source 34
discrepancy
6 Relationship between discrepancy and 36
belief change as mediated by cue number
and situation
7 Relationship between discrepancy and relative 38
change as mediated by cue number for film
situation
8 Relationship between discrepancy and belief 42
change as mediated by perceived source
expertise in student situation
9 Relationship between relative discrepancy 44
and probability of acceptance when p^ is
independently obtained (Ajzen and Sejwacz,
1975) or estimated from change scores
(student situation)
10 Relationship between discrepancy and relative 45
change as mediated by cue number
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Social psychologists have long been interested in isolating and
interrelating variables determining the effectiveness of persuasive
communications. Message discrepancy and source credibility are two
variables which have been considered important determinants. Unfortu-
nately, research on these factors has produced largely inconsistent
results (cf. Fishbein and Ajzen, 1972, 1975; Ostrom, Steel and Smilansky,
1974; Sears and Abeles, 1969). For example, early investigations of
discrepancy found that its relationship to persuasion was sometimes
positive (Fisher and Lubin, 1958; Goldberg, 1954; Harvey, 1962; Hovland
and Pritzker, 1957; Zimbardo, 1960) and sometimes negative (Hovland,
Harvey, and Sherif, 1957) while initial research on credibility dis-
covered that increases in credibility enhanced persuasion for some topics
but not for others (Hovland and Weiss, 1951).
Explanations of these apparent contradictions were later chiefly
explained in terms of either social judgment theory (Sherif and Hovland,
1961; Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, 1965) or dissonance theory
(Aronson, Turner, and Carlsmith, 1963; Festinger, 1957). Although for
different reasons, both theories maintain that, up to some optional
level, increases in discrepancy produce increases in persuasion; as
discrepancy is further increased, however, persuasion decreases. Both
theories also maintain that the effects of credibility depend upon the
discrepancy of the communicator's position. At low levels of discrepancy,
little difference between the persuasive effectiveness of high and low
credible communicators is expected. As discrepancy is increased to
moderate levels, highly credible communicators are expected to become
increasingly more persuasive relative to sources of low credibility.
Eventually, however, further increases in discrepancy reduce the per-
suasive appeal of even highly credible sources. Thus, at extreme
discrepancy levels, relatively small differences in the persuasive
effectiveness of high and low credible sources are again expected.
The line of reasoning developed by social judgment and dissonance
theories offered an intuitively compelling explanation of the inconsistent
effects of both discrepancy and credibility. Specifically, these theories
suggested that studies finding a positive relation between discrepancy
and persuasion may have manipulated discrepancy at levels ranging from
low to moderate. Studies obtaining a negative relationship on the other
hand may have manipulated discrepancy at levels ranging from moderate
to extreme. Moreover, studies obtaining insignificant effects of
credibility may have placed the position of the communicator at either
very low or very extreme levels of discrepancy. Unfortunately, although
some research has obtained the expected quadratic relationship between
discrepancy and persuasion (Insko, Murashima, and Saiyadain, 1966;
Johnson. 1966; Koslln, Stoop, and Loh, 1967) and the interactive
relationship between discrepancy and credibility (Aronson, Turner,
and Carlsmith, 1963; Bochner and Insko, 1966; Harvey, 1962), these
predicted results either have not been consistently produced or when
found, are often not easily explanable in terms of social judgment or
dissonance constructs (Aronson. Turner, and Carlsmith, 1963; Bergin,
1962; Brewer and Crano, 1968; Eagly, 1974; Koslin, Stoop, and Loh, 1967;
Rhine and Severance, 1970).
Research in this area tends to employ different dimensions along
which to manipulate discrepancy and to measure persuasion. Further,
studies vary in the degree to which they use supportive arguments to
butress the position of the communicator. For example, in some studies
(e.g. Bochner and Insko, 1966) subjects are first asked to estimate the
number of hours of sleep that are required by the average young adult.
Discrepancy is manipulated by then exposing subjects to a communicator
arguing a number of hours of sleep variously different from that
initially indicated by the subject. In these studies, supportive argu-
ments are employed to support the source's position. Persuasion is
measured in terms of post-communication changes in subjects' estimates
of the number of hours of sleep. On the other hand, other studies
(e.g. Fisher, Rubinstein, and Freman, 1956) first ask subjects to
estimate the number of dots depicted in a series of slides. Discrepancy
in these studies is manipulated by exposing subjects to numerosity
judgments of confederates which are variously divergent from their own
and for which no supportive evidence is given. Here persuasion is
measured in terms of post-communication changes in judgments of dot
numerosity.
The use of different dimensions seems to assume that factors
affecting change along one dimension equally affect change along any
other. The use of different kinds of persuasive messages seems to
assume that the effects of independent variables on any given dimension
do not vary with the content of the communication. The validity of
these assumptions, however, has seldom been tested. In contrast,
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have recently put forth an analysis of the
persuasive communication situation which centers on one dimension, that
of subjective probability or belief, and which places greater emphasis
on the content of the message.
According to this approach, a typical persuasive communication
consists of a series of informational items or belief statements linking
with some probability an object to an attribute. Generally, one of these
statements or source beliefs represents the major position or the con-
clusion of the message. Corresponding to this belief is the initial
opinion or subjective probability of the receiver which may change
following exposure to the message. For example, a communicator might
argue that the average young adult requires only four hours of sleep
each night. That is, a communicator might argue that the chances are
100% that the average young adult requires only four hours of sleep.
Here the object, "the average young adult", is associated with the
attribute "requires only four hours of sleep" with a subjective
probability of 1.00. Corresponding to this belief is the receiver's
initial opinion that the average young adult requires four hours of
sleep. The receiver, however, may believe that the chances are 70%
that the average young adult requires four hours of sleep. Depending
on the degree to which the receiver finds the conclusion of the
communicator acceptable, changes in his corresponding opinion in the
direction of the message may follow. Thus, in the above example, belief
change would be said to have occured if the receiver came to believe
that the chances are 85% that the average young adult requires four
hours of sleep.
It is important to note here that Fishbein and Ajzen draw a sharp
distinction between acceptance of a source belief and chanRe in the
receiver's corresponding belief. Congruent with traditional analyses,
especially that of Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) and McGuire (1968),
Fishbein and Ajzen view acceptance as necessary for change. However,
acceptance is not viewed by Fishbein and Ajzen as a sufficient con-
dition for change, as no change is expected when the source and receiver
hold equally strong beliefs. For example, consider a source who argues
that the chances are 100% that the average young adult requires only
four hours of sleep. A receiver who also believes the chances are 100%
will find this conclusion highly acceptable. However, there will be no
change in the receiver's opinion. Thus, unlike traditional approaches,
Fishbein and Ajzen treat acceptance and change as distinctly separate
constructs where change is seen as a function of both acceptance and
the initial discrepancy between the source and receiver beliefs.
The remaining statements in the message are usually included to
support the conclusion of the message. Thus, for example, a communicator
might support his position that the average young adult requires only
four hours of sleep by arguing that eight hours is more sleep than is
physiologically or psychologically necessary. As with all source
beliefs, each supportive argument associates an object with an attribute
with some probability. In this example, the source implies that the
chances are 100% that eight hours is more sleep than is physiologically
or psychologically necessary. For each supportive argument there
exists a corresponding belief of the receiver. However, the receiver
may agree with the source or hold a discrepant opinion; that is, he may
also believe the chances are 100% or feel that the chances are only 60%
that eight hours is too much sleep.
Typically, supportive arguments are assumed to form a logical
foundation upon which the conclusion can be based. This line of
reasoning has led researchers to conclude that receivers who accept
supportive arguments will necessarily come to more strongly believe in
the conclusion. Thus, since highly acceptable supportive arguments
are assumed to facilitate persuasion, they are often included in the
message. This assumption, however, confuses acceptance with change
by presupposing a one-to-one relationship between acceptance of
supportive arguments and increased belief in them. As with source
beliefs in general, strong acceptance of a supportive argument will not
produce large increases in the receiver's corresponding opinion when the
initial discrepancy between the source and receiver's opinions is small.
For example, consider a source who argues that the chances are 100% that
people sleep too much. If prior to the receipt of this message the
receiver believes the chances are 95%, exposure to this argument can
produce only little change in the receiver's opinion. However, the
receiver will probably find this argument highly acceptable.
In sum, then, Fishbein and Ajzen have suggested an analysis of the
persuasive communication situation which focuses on changes in the
receiver's belief in the conclusion of a message along a dimension of
subjective probability. This change is thought to be affected by the
acceptability of the conclusion although acceptance is not seen as
sufficient for the prediction of change. Change may be facilitated
through exposure to supportive arguments but only to the degree to
which supportive arguments are acceptable and produce changes in the
corresponding beliefs of the receiver and the extent to which they are
related to the conclusion.
If the Fishbein-Ajzen analysis is correct, one must first under-
stand the process by which belief statements are accepted and how such
acceptance produces changes in the receiver's corresponding beliefs.
Unfortunately, research on factors that influence acceptance of items
of information contained in a message is often complicated by the fact
that the persuasive communication consists of many different belief
statements. Acceptance of one statement (and subsequent change in the
receiver's own belief) may affect acceptance of other statements, and
the message may have a multitude of effects which cannot be easily
isolated. Thus, in contrast to much of the past research in this area,
this study considers a persuasive communication which consists of a
single belief statement and examines its effects on the corresponding
belief of the receiver.
According to Fishbein and Ajzen, the probability that a source
belief will be accepted is a function of the discrepancy between the
opinion of the source (termed the source probability) and the belief of
the receiver (termed the initial proximal belief). The greater the
discrepancy, the lower the probability of acceptance. This negative
relationship between discrepancy and probability of acceptance is termed
the acceptance gradient. However, factors other than discrepancy may
also influence probability of acceptance. For example, forming initial
proximal probabilities on the basis of too little information or
associating belief statements with highly expert sources should
facilitate acceptance even at high levels of discrepancy. Variables
8such as the amount of prior information upon which initial beliefs are
based and source expertise are termed facilitating factors, and the
letter f is used to denote the overall facilitation present in the
situation.
In the original statement, Fishbein and Ajzen suggested that over-
all facilitation serves to moderate the relationship between discrepancy
and probability of acceptance, i.e. the acceptance gradient. Specifically,
probability of acceptance, p^, was tentatively viewed as an exponential
function of discrepancy as expressed in Equation 1. m this formulation,
D is the absolute difference between source and receiver beliefs and f
Pa = (1-0) (1)
is overall facilitation. As can be seen in Figure 1, probability of
acceptance decreases rapidly with discrepancy as overall facilitation
falls below 1. Conversely, as f_ exceeds 1, probability of acceptance
remains relatively high even at large discrepancy levels. Whatever the
magnitude of f^, however, p^ approaches 0 whenever D approaches its max-
imal value of 1.
This last characteristic of Equation 1 appeared to be unnecessarily
restrictive and Equation 2 was therefore proposed by Ajzen and Sejwacz
(1975) as an alternative model. Again, the acceptance gradient increases
-D/f
Pa = e (2)
with JE, but p can remain at relatively high levels even when discrepancy
is large.
To test these alternative models, Ajzen and Sejwacz conducted the
0.1 0.2 0.3 0,4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Discrepancy
Figure 1. Family of acceptance gradients for different
degrees of facilitation.
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following study. Under the guise of an information processing experiment,
subjects first provided percentage estimates of their initial beliefs on
three topics: the likelihood that life exists on Jupiter; the likelihood
that violence on TV increases the nation's crime rate; and the likelihood
that the Atomic Energy Commission is misleading the public about the
danger of nuclear power plants. For each topic, subjects were then
exposed to a series of systematically discrepant single-belief messages
attributed to sources of low, medium, and high credibility. For example,
with respect to life on Jupiter, subjects were exposed to the opinions of
a NASA scientist, a science fiction writer, and a New York bartender,
respectively. Subjects indicated their acceptance of each source opinion
on three 7-place bipolar scales having the following endpoints: accept-
able-unacceptable; unresaonable-reasonable; and agreeable-disagreeable.
Responses to these scales were scored from 0 to 6, summed, and divided by
18 (the maximal score) to yield a measure of probability of acceptance.
Consistent with both models, p^ was found to be inversely related to
discrepancy. Moreover, the acceptance gradient was significantly affected
by source credibility. That is, 1) increases in source credibility pro-
duced increases in overall facilitation; and 2) credibility had its greatest
facilitative effects at higher levels of discrepancy. Finally, predicted
values of p^ based upon either model highly correlated with those directly
obtained, although Equation 2 provided a superior fit.
Having developed a model which seems to successfully predict
probability of acceptance, the next step is to determine the relationship
between the acceptance of source opinions, p^, and subsequent changes in
proximal belief. According to Fishbein and Ajzen, the amount of change in
11
a proximal belief depends upon its discrepancy from the source belief
and the probability that the source belief will be accepted. Specifically,
actual change was hypothesized to be a direct function of advocated
change, weighted by its probability of acceptance. That is,
C = P^D. (3)
As can be seen in Figure 2, which plots change against discrepancy for
different levels of overall facilitation, the hypothesized relationship
between change and discrepancy is moderated by f^. For example, at high
levels of f_ (e.g. when the amount of information upon which initial beliefs
are based is low; when sources are highly expert)
,
change is a positive
monotonic function of discrepancy. At lower levels of f_ (e.g. when the
amount of prior information is increased; when sources are low in expertise),
the slope of the relationship between discrepancy and change decreases.
At still lower levels of f^, the relationship becomes quadratic with change
increasing and then decreasing with increases in discrepancy. Moreover,
increases in overall facilitation tend to produce relatively large belief
change when discrepancy is large but have little persuasive effects when
the amount of advocated change is small.
The major purpose of this study is to determine the joint effects
of discrepancy and facilitation on changes in beliefs within a persuasive
communications situation. Two potential facilitating factors are employed:
amount of prior information and source expertise. Having formed initial
proximal beliefs on the basis of varying amounts of information, subjects
are exposed to systematically discrepant belief statements associated
with sources of varying expertise. While increases in source discrepancy
12
Figure 2. Change in the advocated direction as a function of
discrepancy and acceptance gradients with
varying f values.
13
are predicted to produce increases in belief change, the slope of this
relationship is expected to vary with overall facilitation. That is,
decreases in prior information and increases in perceived source expertise
are predicted to produce increases in slope. Put differently, decreasing
amount of prior information and increasing source expertise are expected
to have greatest persuasive impact at more extreme levels of discrepancy.
In short, a main effect of discrepancy and its interactions with amount
of prior information and perceived source expertise are predicted.
An additional implication of Equation 3 merits further discussion.
If C = p^, then it should be possible to estimate probability of accept-
ance by dividing the amount of change observed by the amount of change
advocated. That is, at non-zero levels of discrepancy, p^ should be
estimatable by Equation 4, i.e. relative change. To determine the
validity of Equation 4, individual p^ scores are estimated at each non^
Pa = C/D (4)
zero level of discrepancy by dividing the amount of change observed by
the amount of change advocated. These p^ estimates are used to plot
acceptance gradients and to compute for each subject and for each model
a least squares estimate of f^. To the extent that Equation 4 holds,
increases in the facilitating factors of this study are expected to
produce increases in these estimates of acceptance gradients and f_ levels.
Finally, as a goodness of fit test, the appropriate ^ value of each
subject are entered back, into Equations 1 and 2 to generate, for each model,
a second set of acceptance scores. The correlation between these ad hoc
scores and the original acceptance data is then computed to determine the
14
goodness of fit of each model. To the extent that the relative change
scores to which the models are fitted are valid estimates of p^, the
correlation between the predicted and original acceptance values are
expected to be highly positive.
15
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Design
Five levels of discrepancy for two different situations were
crossed with three amounts of prior information and three levels of
source expertise in a pretest, posttest experiment. On the basis of
pilot work, sources within each situation were selected so as to repre-
sent strong differences in perceived expertise. Situation (a high school
Senior applying for admission into a mid-western state university and a
French film recently released abroad), amount of prior information (low,
medium, and high), and source expertise (low, medium, and high) served
as between-subjects variables while discrepancy (0, .15, .30, .45, and
.60) served as a within-subj ects factor.
Subjects
180 male and female participants drawn from the University of
Massachusetts-Amherst and the State University of New York-Oswego were
randomly assigned to one of 18 experimental conditions formed by crossing
situation with amount of prior information and source expertise. Subjects
were run individually. Participation was purely voluntary in all cases
although some received academic credit (n = A) while others money (n = 64)
.
Materials
Situations . Prior and posterior proximal beliefs were obtained in
two different situations. For the student situation, subjects estimated
the chances that each of a set of high school Seniors would be accepted
into a mid-western state university. In the film situation, subjects
estimated the chances that each of a set of French films would be shown
16
in the United States. On the first page of a two-page booklet, each
student or film was profiled in terms of his or its relative position on
a set of descriptive dimensions or cues. The level of each cue ranged
on an eleven-point scale, from very low to very high. For example,
students profiled in terms of the cue, "His grade point average", ranged
from very low (scale position 1-3), to average (position 6), to very high
(positions 9-11) grade point averages. Similarly, films described in
terms of their production costs ranged from very low, to average, to
very high production costs. On the basis of pilot work, the specific
level of each cue used to describe each student or film was selected so
that within each situation low, medium, and high initial probabilities
were produced. The number of cues used to describe each set of students
or films varied, however, with the amount of prior information manipulated.
Prior information manipulation . The amount of prior information
upon which subjects based their initial opinions was manipulated by
varying the number of cues used to describe each set of students or films.
Thus, in the low, medium, and high information conditions, each profile
consisted of two, four, or six cues, respectively. In order to maximize
the information manipulation, however, the specific cues used in each
information condition were intuitively selected on the basis of their
apparent relevance to the judgment under consideration. Thus, in the
low information condition of the student situation, subjects estimated
the chances the student would be accepted based only upon the educational
level of the student's mother and his economic status. In the medium
information condition, the student's grade point average and the academic
quality of his high school were added to the profile. Finally, in the
17
high information condition, the six cues used to describe each student
consisted of those of the four cue condition plus the number of extra-
curricular activities engaged in by the student and his SAT scores.
Similarly, in the film condition, subjects estimated the chances that
the film would be shown in the United States based only upon the film's
production costs and the star's acting ability. In the medium information
condition, information regarding the amount of violence in the film and
the director's skill were added to the cues of the low information
condition. Lastly, in the high information condition, the star's
popularity and the number of favorable reviews of the film were added
to the information used in the medium information profile. Thus, the
amount of prior information functionally available within each situation
was expected to increase with increases in both cue number and relevance.
Source expertise manipulation . On the basis of pilot work, three
sources varying significantly in their perceived expertise were
selected for each situation. Sources of low, medium, and high expertise
were, for the student situation, a high school friend of the student,
a Freshman at the university to which the student applied, and a dean of
admissions at a university similar to the one to which the student
applied, respectively. An usher at a local movie house, a film major
at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst , and a film critic for the
New York Times served as low, medium, and high expertise sources for the
film situation.
Measurement of proximal beliefs . In order to measure receiver
beliefs, a response sheet was attached to each profile. In the initial
phase of the experiment (see Procedure), subjects indicated their initial
18
:he
proximal beliefs along a lOO-point probability scale found on the second
page. That is, following each student profile, subjects indicated on tl
second page of the booklet the chances the student would be accepted along
a lOO-point scale ranging from 0% ("definitely will not be accepted")
,
50% ("may or may not be accepted"), to 100% ("definitely will be accepted")
Similarly, subjects exposed to film profiles responded on a lOO-point
probability scale ranging from "definitely will not be shown in the United
States", "may or may not be shown in the United States", to "definitely
vdJJ be shown in the United States." In the communication phase (see
Procedure)
,
the second page contained two similarly constructed lOO-point
probability scales, the first indicating the source belief associated with
each profile while the second serving as a measure of posterior proximal
probability.
Post-experimental questionnaire
. At the end of the experiment, a
questionnaire was administered in which subjects rated the perceived
expertise of the source on the following bi-polar, nine-place scales
adopted from Applbaum and Anatol (1973): Informed-Uninformed; and
Inexperienced-Experienced. As these scales highly correlated (r = .469
and .506 for the student and film situations, respectively, p^.OOl),
responses were summed and used in the assessment of post-communication
changes in perceived expertise.
The remainder of the questionnaire attempted to assess awareness of
the hypotheses. Two questions asked the respondents to describe what
they thought was the true purpose of the experiment and to discuss the
nature of their suspicions. Subjects (n = 9) who indicated an awareness
of the pretest-posttest design or guessed that either expertise and/or cue
19
number and/or discrepancy had been systematically manipulated were dis-
carded from the analysis. Since the manipulation of discrepancy involved
the repitition of five of the profiles (see Procedure), a third question
asked subjects to indicate the degree of similarity perceived among all
the profiles used, while the last question blatantly requested subjects
to indicate the number of profiles (if any) repeated throughout the
experiment. Analyses of these data indicate that, in general, regardless
of the number of cues, subjects were unable to correctly guess the number
of repeated profiles, although student two-cue subjects tended to guess
a somewhat greater number (2-3 profiles being the modal response) than
did those exposed to six student cues (0 profiles being the modal response)
Procedure
Initial phase
.
In the initial phase of an experiment ostensibly
dealing with information processing, subjects first responded to a set
of 15 "practice" profiles supposedly designed to familiarize the subject
with the nature of the task. In actuality, a subset of five critical
profiles were included to produce judgments representing five initial
proximal beliefs. For the student situation, these beliefs were equal to
or less than .40 while for the film situation, the critical judgments
were equal to or greater than .60. Prior beliefs were established at
these levels in order to allow for the presentation of highly discrepant
source beliefs above or below the receiver's initial opinion.
Each subject was seated behind a visual barrier and asked to open
to the first practice profile. The experimenter then read the following.
This Is a study of how people process information. In
order to familiarize you with the task you will be asked to
perform later in the experiment, you will first be given a
20
practice series of profiles of high school Seniors applying for
admission into a mid-western state university (French films
recently released abroad). Note that along the left-hand margin
of the top page are listed the characteristics we will use in
constructing the descriptions of the students (films). Listed
horizontally are the different degrees to which each characteristic
may be possessed by the students (films). For each of the students(films), I will tell you to what degree the student (film) possesses
each of these characteristics. As we go over each trait you should
circle the corresponding position on the profile. After you have
filled out each profile, you will be asked to make a judgment on
the attached page. Before making your judgment, however, be sure to
review the information given to you in the profile.
You will be asked to make the following judgment; Based upon
the information given in this summary, do you think this student
will be accepted by the university (film will be shown in the
United States)? You are to indicate what you think the chances are
the student will be accepted (film will be shown) on the 100 point
scale provided. For example, if you think the student definitely
will not be accepted (film definitely will not be shown), you should
circle 0%. If you think the student may or may not be accepted
(film may or may not be shown), circle 50%. And if you think the
student definitely will be accepted (film definitely will be shown),
circle 100%. Thus, the greater the percentage circled, the greater
you think the chances are the student will be accepted by the
university (film will be shown in the United States). Of course,
you can circle any point along the scale, not just 0, 50, or 100%.
Thus, you may wish to circle 45%, 68%, 90%~whichever of the 100
points on the scale best represents what you think the chances are
the student will be accepted (film will be shown), given the informa-
tion contained in the profile. Remember, base your judgments only
on the information given in each profile and make your judgments
independently of judgments made on past profiles.
In order to immediately obtain initial proximal probabilities, subjects
were then told:
Once you are satisfied with your judgment and have indicated
it on the scale, please tell me what your judgment was. You should
also indicate in terms of a yes/no response whether or not the
student will be accepted (film will be shown). For example, you
might respond: "Yes, I think the student will be accepted (film
will be shown). His (Its) chances are 85%;" or "No, I don't think
the student will be accepted (film will be shown). His (Its)
chances are only 24%". These verbal responses will not only
indicate to me that you are ready to continue on to the next profile,
but will also show me that you understand how the scale works.
These instructions not only allowed for the immediate assessment of prior
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proximal beliefs but also insured that subjects were correctly interpreting
the scale.
To allay any suspicion concerning the visual barrier, the experimenter
concluded with:
Finally, in order that your judgments are made in privacy and are
not biased by the experimenter, a visual barrier has been placed
between you and the experimenter. Any questions? (Questions were
answered by rereading the appropriate instructions.)
For each of the initial set of 15 profiles, the experimenter read to
the subject the degree to which the students or films possessed each of
the characteristics listed in the profiles. The subjects, in turn,
circled the corresponding positions on their profiles and verbally
announced their judgments. As the initial phase progressed, the experimenter
recorded all responses, including the five critical judgments which
served as measures of initial proximal beliefs.
Distraction task. The manipulation of discrepancy involved including
the five critical profiles of the initial phase within a second set of
profiles presented in the communication phase (see below) . In order that
these repeated communication profiles not be recognized, a distraction
task was interjected between the initial and communication phases.
Subjects were told that one way to study information processing systems
is to force subjects to make sense out of seemingly senseless data.
Subjects were then required to solve, within sixty seconds, each of 10
anagrams. To further increase the distractive impact of the task, the
experimenter openly recorded the time required to solve each anaf.ram, the
total number of correct solutions, and the verbal comments made regarding
the difficulty of each anagram.
Communication phase
.
Following the anagrams task, subjects responded to
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a second set of 15 profiles. In addition to the cues used in the initial
set of "practice" profiles, these profiles included the opinions of an
individual of low, mediu., or high expertise (see above). The experimenter
explained.
We will now ask you to make the kinds of judgments with whichyou became familiar in the practice session, usin^ however ad fferent set of students (films). Of course, in'kal life peopleoften consult others before making judgments of this kind. Thereforeto make things more realistic, I will not only describe to you aset of new students (films), but will also include the opinions ofanother individual. Once again, you will be asked to indicate the
chances that the student will be accepted by the university (film
will be shown in the United States)
.
Five of the fifteen profiles were identical to the five critical profiles
used in the initial phase. Belief discrepancy was manipulated by randomly
assigning, for each subject, each of the five levels of discrepancy (0,
.15, .30, .45, and .60) to each of these repeated profiles. Source beliefs
for the student profiles were always equal to or greater than the corres-
ponding initial judgments. Conversely, source beliefs associated with
the film profiles were always equal to or less than the corresponding
initial proximal beliefs.
For example, imagine that, for a particular subject, the profile of
student number 2 was randomly assigned to a discrepancy level of. 15. If,
In the initial phase, the proximal belief produced by this profile was
.30, then the corresponding source belief in the communication phase was
.30 + .15 or .45. That is, a receiver who initially believed that the
chances were 30% that student number 2 will be accepted by the university
was exposed to a source who believed the chances were 45%. Conversely,
the source belief associated with a critical film profile randomly
assigned to a discrepancy level of .60 was always 60% less than that
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indicated by the subject in the initial phase.
Following exposure to the source opinion, subjects then indicated
their own belief. Receiver opinions associated with the five critical
profiles represented the posterior proximal beliefs formed at different
levels of discrepancy.
In order to maximize the privacy with which posterior judgments were
made, the experimenter concluded with the following:
Since in the practice session you seemed to show an under-
standing of how the scale works, it will not be necessary for
you to verbally respond. However, please be sure that your
circles are neat and sufficiently small so that your exact judg-
ments are quite clear. That is, please circle only a single
point, not a group of points.
Finally, remember to review all the information given to you
before making each of your judgments. Any questions?
The experimenter then read to the subjects the information contained in
each profile as well as the opinions of the source. Subjects, in turn,
recorded the information, indicated the source beliefs on the response
sheets, and then recorded their own judgments.
After completing the last profile, subjects responded to the post-
experimental questionnaire. Subjects were then fully debriefed and sworn
to secrecy.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Manipulation checks
Amount of prior information
. The amount of information in each
situation was manipulated, in part, by selecting on the basis of intuition,
cues which varied in their apparent relevance. If this manipulation
was successful, the cues given in the two cue condition should have been
perceived as having little informational value as compared with that of
the four and six cue conditions. Put differently, when all six pieces of
information were made available, little weight should have been given to
the low information cues during the judgment-making process. This line
of reasoning suggests that the relative perceived informational value of
each cue can be estimated by determining the proportion of variance
accounted for by each cue for judgments made in the six cue condition.
Accordingly, for each situation, judgments made in the six cue
condition during the initial phase of the experiment were submitted to
a forward or stepwise inclusion multiple regression analysis. Initial
proximal probabilities served as the criterion variable, predicted on
the basis of the six cues. As the six cue condition consisted of 30
subjects each producing 15 judgments, a total of 450 criterion scores were
available. Levels of each cue, of course, varied across the fifteen
profiles used in the initial phase of the experiment.
Table 1 summarizes the results of this analysis. In general, a
linear model does a good job in accounting for the variability in initial
proximal probabilities. The multiple correlation coefficients for the
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Table 1
Proportion of Total Variance in Initial Proximal ProbabilitiesAccounted for by Each cue in the Six-cue Condition of Each Situation
Student Situation
P
Cues Of
1. Scholastic Aptitude
Test Scores
2. Mother's Educational
Level
3. Grade Point Average
A. Academic Quality of
High School
5. Number of Extracurricular
Activities
6. Economic Status
Cues
oportion
Variance
Sum of
Squares F
Employed
2 4 6
24.02% 7.345 251.82** X
18.56%
11.90%
5.675
3.640
195.33**
125.29**
X X X
X X
2.88% .881 30.33** X X
.50%
.06%
.154
.081
5.29*
.63 X
X
X X
Film Situation
Cues
Proportion Sum of Employed
Cues Of Variance Squares F 2 4 6
1. Production Costs 28.39% 10.142 517.23** XXX
2. Star's Popularity 23.15% 8.271 421.81** X
3. Number of Favorable
Reviews 15.41% 5.503 280.66** X
4. Star's Acting Ability 7.58% 2.707 138.04** XXX
5. Amount of Violence 1.01% .360 18.37** X X
6. Director's Skill .13% .047 2.40 X X
**Variance added to regression model significant beyond the .0001 level.
*Variance added to regression model significant beyond the .05 level.
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student and film situations were .761 and
.870, respectively. Consistent
with research findings in the area of cue utilization (cf. Dawes and
Corrigan, 1974; Slovic and Llchtenstein. 1971), these coefficients indicate
that the information of the type used in this study was combined in a
basically linear fashion. These results also indicate that measuring
the subjective impact of each cue in terms of a linear model is highly
reasonable.
In the student situation, three cues account for a relatively high
proportion of the variance: SAT scores, mother's educational level, and
grade point average. It is concluded therefore that these three cues were
perceived as having the highest informational value, while the remaining
three cues, academic quality of high school, number of extracurricular
activities, and economic status, were perceived as being relatively un-
important. Of the three important cues, only grade point average and
mother's educational level were included in the four cue or medium in-
formation condition, the other cues being academic quality of high school
and economic status. In the two cue or low information condition, only
mother's educational level was included, being paired with economic
status, a cue which seems to have had no impact whatsoever. Thus it
appears that the manipulation of cue number in the student situation
successfully manipulated the amount of prior information.
This overall pattern also occurs in the film situation as well.
Here, however, four cues were relatively important: production costs,
starring actor's popularity, number of favorable reviews, and starring
actor's acting ability. Only a subset of these cues however appeared in
the two cue condition while the four cue condition included those of the
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two cue group, one unimportant cue, and one cue which accounts for a small
but highly significant amount of variance. It seems clear, however, that
the difference in the amount of information between the two and four cue
conditions was not as great as that found in the student situation. More-
over, the informational value of the cues given in the two cue film
condition seems to have been much greater than that of the student situ-
ation: while two important cues were employed in the film situation,
only one such cue, paired with a totally unimportant piece of information,
was used in the corresponding student condition. Despite these differences,
however, the results of this analysis strongly suggest that increase in
cue number were associated with increases in the amount of prior infor-
mation upon which initial proximal beliefs were based.
Perceived source expertise
. Post-experimental ratings of source
expertise for each situation were submitted to a two-way analysis of
variance with cue number and source as fixed factors. The results of
this analysis indicate that the source manipulation did not successfully
maintain large differences in expertise over the course of the experiment.
As can be seen in Table 2, only the student sources varied significantly
in their post-experimental ratings, the mean expertise of the dean of
admissions being greater than the average of the other two sources.
Unfortunately, the absolute difference among the student sources is
relatively small. For both situations neither the main effect of cue
number nor its interaction with source were significant.
As Table 2 indicates, ratings obtained from control subjects in pilot
work clearly demonstrate that the sources used in either situation varied
strongly and significantly in their initial expertise. To determine the
Table 2
Mean Control and Post-experimental Ratings of, and Changes InSource Expertise for Each Situation as a Function of Source
'
Source
Situation Friend Freshman Dean F
Control Group 6.300^ 9.900 15.500 24.107^''^
Student Experimental
Group 8.533 7.300 11.700 lA.ige^''^
Change +2.230® -2.600®
-3.800® 27.578^'^
Usher Film Major Critic F
Control Group 8.300 12.150 16.450
Film Experimental
Group 10.067 10.900 11.833 1.897 c
Change +1.767^
-1.250^
-4.617^ 24.810'^''^
The greater the mean, the greater the source expertise.
''Main effect of source tested against 2 and 38 df.
^Main effect of source tested against 2 and 81 df.
"Significant beyond the .001 level.
jSignif icantly different from zero beyond the .001 level by t-test.
Significantly different from zero beyond the .05 level by t-test.
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magnitude of changes in perceived expertise over the course of the
experiment, the appropriate mean control ratings were subtracted from
each experimental subject's post-experimental rating. These changes in
perceived expertise scores were then submitted for each situation to a
cue number by source analysis of variance. As would be expected, a main
effect for source was obtained. Indeed, the data suggest that highly
expert sources lost and low expert sources gained in expertise. However,
since the expertise scales are probably less than perfectly reliable,
the apparent gain in the expertise of the low expert sources may be arti-
factual, extreme scores becoming, upon retest, less extreme. It is doubt-
ful, however, that, given its magnitude, the loss in expertise sufferred
by the high expert sources is totally due to this regression effect. It
is therefore concluded that, over the course of the experiment, moderate
and high expert sources suffered a genuine loss in perceived expertise.
Belief change and relative change
Changes in proximal beliefs at each level of discrepancy were
measured by taking the algebraic difference between judgments obtained
in the initial and communication phases of the experiment for each of the
five critical profiles. Relative change scores were computed by dividing
the amount of change obtained by the amount of change advocated at each
non-zero level of discrepancy. Since the effects of discrepancy and cue
number on these measures often interacted with situation, the student
and film data were separately submitted to a three-way analysis of variance
in which cue number and source served as between-subjects variables and
discrepancy as a within-subjects factor.
Discrepancy and cue number . As predicted, a main effect of
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discrepancy on change in student-related beliefs was obtained (F
25.491, p^.OOl). As can be seen in Figure 3, left-hand panel, thlT
relationship was positive and primarily linear with the linear component
accounting for 96% of the variance due to discrepancy. Moreover, the
slope of this relationship was significantly affected by the amount of
prior information (F = 3.308. p<.001). This discrepancy by cue
8,324
number interaction is graphed in Figure 4 while the corresponding linear
regression coefficients are displayed in Table 3. As expected, increases
in amount of prior information produced significant decreases in slope
although the linear coefficients of the four and six cue conditions did
not significantly differ. Thus, while increases in discrepancy produced
increases in change, the strength of this relationship was significantly
weakened by increasing the amount of information upon which initial
proximal beliefs were based. Viewed from a different perspective, this
interaction indicates that the persuasive impact of decreases in cue
number was strongest at more extreme levels of discrepancy.
In view of the above results, one would expect, for the student
situation, a negative relationship between discrepancy and probability
of acceptance, the slope of this relationship varying across number of
cues. This expectation, of course, assumes that probability of acceptance
and relative change are interchangeable. Unfortunately, while the main
effect of discrepancy on C/D was significant (F = 2.618, p^.05),
3,243
and as can be seen in Figure 5, in the predicted direction, estimates of
p at low levels of discrepancy seem to be surprisingly low. Moreover,
a
the discrepancy by cue number interaction was far from statistically
reliable (F = 1.225).
6,243
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Table 3
Linear Regression Coefficients for Each Situation
as a function of Cue Number
Cue Number
Situation 2 45
Student .064^ .033^ .020^
Film .025^
.007 .036^
'Significantly different from
Significantly different from
Significantly different from
zero beyond the .001 level,
zero beyond the .01 level,
zero beyond the .05 level.
(a/O) aSlTBtlO 9AT^VX9H
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Turning to the film situation, a main effect of discrepancy on
change was again obtained (F = 14.682, p/.OOl). This relation-
4,324
ship is graphed in the right-hand panel of Figure 3. As in the student
situation, the linear component was significant (F = 28.285, p/.OOl),
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accounting for 76% of the variance due to discrepancy. However, further
analyses revealed that beliefs formed on the basis of the information
given in the film situation were more resistant to change. Specifically,
treating situation as an additional between-subjects variable, it was
found that the slope of the film situation was significantly lower than
that of its student counterpart (F = 5.937, p^.05). Moreover,
1,162
analyzing the film data separately revealed that the relationship between
discrepancy and change was significantly quadratic as well (F = 9.330,
. 1,181
PS«01) such that extreme levels of discrepancy produced decreases in
change
.
As in the student situation, the discrepancy by cue number inter-
action was significant (F = 2.236, p<.05). This interaction is
8,325
depicted in the right-hand panel of Figure 4 while the corresponding
linear coefficients are displayed in Table 3. As visual inspection
indicates, however, the form of this interaction varied from that obtained
in the student situation in three important ways. First, the slopes
did not decrease monotonically with increases in cue number. Rather,
the relationship between cue number and slope approximates a U-shaped
function. Secondly, as depicted in Figure 6, the effects of discrepancy
on change in the two cue condition was significantly greater in the student
situation (F = 11.684, p</.001). Thirdly, decreases in cue number
1,162
produced relatively small increments in slope. Thus, the facilitative
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effects of prior amount of information were greatly diminished in the film
situation, again indicating that the film-related beliefs were more
resistant to change.
As for the estimate of p^, a strong main effect of discrepancy in
the expected direction was obtained (F = 9.032, p^.OOl). That is
3,243
increases in discrepancy produced significant decreases in relative
change. However, as seen in the right-hand panel of Figure 5, estimates
of Pa are again surprisingly low even at low levels of discrepancy.
Moreover, the discrepancy by cue number interaction, graphed in Figure
7, was significant only at the .10 level (F = 1.912).
6,243
Perceived expertise
. No significant source effects on either
absolute or relative change were found in either situation. This result,
however, may be due to the inability of the source manipulation to main-
tain differences in perceived expertise large enough to produce statis-
tically reliable effects. Consequently, an internal analysis was con-
ducted in which subjects in each situation were classified according to
their post-experimental ratings of perceived expertise (low, medium, and
high). As Table 4 indicates, this classification successfully produced,
in both situations, strong differences in perceived expertise. For each
situation, a three-way analysis of variance, formed by crossing perceived
expertise with cue number and discrepancy, was then performed.
For both situations, change was significantly influenced by dis-
crepancy in the expected direction (F = 17.596, p^.OOl, student
4,216
situation; F = 8.386, p/.OOl, film situation). In both situations,
4,180
^
the discrepancy by cue number interaction closely paralleled those dis-
cussed earlier although the student interaction was significant only at
Figxire 7. Relationship between discrepancy and relative
change as mediated by cue number for film
situation.
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Table 4
Mean Perceived Expertise Scores
Perceived Expertise
Situation Low Medium High F
Student 4.810^ 8.286 13.524 235. 731^'^
Film 6.333 10.222 14.278 284. 056^.^
^The greater the mean, the greater the perceived expertise.
''Perceived expertise main effect tested against 2 and 54 df.
^Perceived expertise main effect tested against 2 and 45 df.
•^Significant beyond the .001 level.
AO
the
.10 level (F = 1.88, student situation; F = 3.019, 01
,
. , 8,180 ' '
*
tlim situation). More interesting, however, are the differential effects
exhibited by perceived expertise in each situation.
As can be seen in Table 5, the discrepancy by perceived expertise
interaction for the student situation was significant beyond the .05
level (F = 2.120). This interaction is depicted in Figure 8. Further
8 , 216
analysis revealed that 95% of the variance associated with this inter-
action was due to significant variation in the linear component across
the three levels of expertise (F = 4.555, p<.05). That is, increases
4,45
in expertise were associated with increases in slope (linear coefficients
of .015, .053, and .052, respectively). The slope of the medium and high
expertise sources, however, did not significantly differ. On the other
hand, the corresponding interaction in the film situation was far from
statistically reliable (F = 1.276). As indicated in Table 5, this
8,180
failure to reach significance is due to a relatively small interaction
mean square rather than to an inordinately high error term. Thus, while
facilitating changes in student-related beliefs, perceived expertise had
little persuasive impact in the film situation. Once again the data
suggest that beliefs formed on the basis of information in the film
situation were less susceptible to change.
Given the effects reported in the preceeding analysis, a discrepancy
main effect for both situations, a discrepancy by cue number interaction
in at least the film situation and a student discrepancy by perceived
expertise interaction on relative change would be expected. However,
most of these effects were either not significant or did not follow the
expected pattern. Specifically, in the student situation, the nain effect
41
CO CM \0
CO
CO
s
cn CM iH
o
00
cn CM
• •
00 fH
CO pe
0)
0) 6C
u M a
d «dm 13 j=
•H 0) CJ)
(U u >
fH •H M-l
Xt > (1) <U
td a •HH
O Pe Be
m
•H ^>^ c
(0 o
>^
iH
Ana
umbe
iH
•H (U
3
u CJ
cd
u
o
0
•H
C3
O
•HU
(0
3
4->
•H
CO
4J
c
(U
3
CO
CO
CO
73
o
cd
>
(U
CJ
M
3
O
to
iH 0^ rH
iH C» CO
00 .H ON
iH OO O O
CO 00 O
00
J3 O
VO O
cr> CM
• •
l>» CM
in m CO
r>» vO On
C^J iH
vO CO iH
CM O O
CO 00 vO
iH
0)
CO
•H
4J
a.
X
>»
CJ CJ
c c
(d cd
a. a.
0) (U
M )-i
CJ o
CO c/i
o
COM
•
(U
Cd •
3 rH
cr iH
CO > 0)
(U >
iH (U
cd rH
rH
B O LOO O
S •
iH
•H 0) (U
4-1
•u 4J
O
13
c C
4-1 o o
c
(U 0)
TJ
3
4J U
CO
cd Cd
CJ CJ
O •H •H
(t-i c«
O •H •H
•H
& CiJ 60
cd •H •H
CO CO
Cd o
A2
Discrepeuicy
Student Situation
Figure 8. Relationship between discrepancy and belief change
as mediated by perceived source expertise in
student situation.
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of discrepancy and its interaction with expertise were significantly only
at the
.10 level. Moreover, neither of these effects compare favorably
with those obtained by Ajzen and Sejwacz (1975). As Figure 9 clearly
shows, relative change underestimates theoretical expectations of
probability of acceptance at low levels of discrepancy.
As for the film situation, the discrepancy main effect was significant
(^3,135 = 3.227, p<.05), as was its interaction with cue number (F, =
\J y ^ J ^
2.748, p <.05). However, as Figure 10 demonstrates, low levels of
discrepancy are associated with low levels of probability of acceptance.
Overall facilitation
The change data demonstrate that cue number and perceived expertise
can serve as facilitating factors. An alternative approach is to examine
the effects of amount of prior information and perceived expertise on the
facilitation parameter, f^. Following Ajzen and Sejwacz, Equations 5 and
6 were used to compute least-squares estimates of f^ for both the original
Fishbein-Ajzen model (Equation 1) and the modified version suggested by
Ajzen and Sejwacz (Equation 2). However, as the results of analyses of
J. V •.
f= ^[ln(l-D)]2
^[In(l-D) • In p^]
1 =
^(In . D)
(5)
(6)
these alternative f^ levels were comparable, no further distinction between
them will be made.
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Figxire 10. Relationship between discrepancy and relative
change as mediated by cue number.
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were
For each of the 90 subjects in each situation, estimates of f
computed. It is important to note that in this study, relative change was
used as an estimate of probability of acceptance. A two-way analysis of
variance was then performed on these estimates for each situation, cue
number and source serving as fixed factors.
Table 6 summarizes the results of these analyses. Recall that cue
number significantly affected change in both situations. However, the
corresponding main effect of cue number of f was significant in the
student situation only (p <.01), although the mean f levels for the film
situation were in the expected direction. It should be noted, however,
that a film cue number effect may be more difficult to obtain since
the facilitation effects of cue number were diminished. In neither
situation was source or its interaction with cue number significant. This
is not surprising since the source manipulation had no effect on change.
To determine the effects of perceived source expertise on f , the
cue number by perceived expertise analysis discussed above was again
conducted, with f as the dependent variable. Since perceived expertise
facilitated change in the student situation only, a main effect of
expertise on f_ in the film situation was not expected and not found.
However, as can be seen in Table 7, the student expertise main effect
was also insignificant although the means are in the expected direction.
The effects of cue number closely corresponded to those obtained in the
cue number by source analysis with amount of prior information significantly
affecting student estimates of f^ only (p <.05); the cue number main effect
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Table 6
Mean f_ Levels as a Function of
Cue Number and Situation
Situation
Student
Film
Model 2 4 6 F
Equation 1 (4 levels)^ .845 .369 .444 7 445^
Equation 2 (4 levels) .556 .247 .299 7 041^
Equation 2 (3 levels)^ .717 .293 .326 8 813^^
Equation 1 (4 levels) .496 .325 .481 1 .663
Equation 2 (A levels) .327 .223 .315 1 .381
Equation 2 (3 levels) .380 .239 .398 1 .596
_f levels computed on the basis of all non-zero levels
^of discrepancy.
f^ levels computed on the basis of three most extreme
levels of discrepancy.
^Significant beyond the .01 level, 2/81 df.
Significant beyond the .001 level, 2/81 df.
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Table 7
Mean Levels for Student Situation
as a Function of Perceived Source Expertise
Model
Equation 1 (4 levels)^
Equation 2 (4 levels)
Equation 2 (3 levels)^
Perceived
Source Expertise
Low Medium High F
.348 .632
.701 2.360
.241 .416 .461 2.062
.262 .481 .554 3.268^^
f_ levels computed on the basis of all non-zero levels
^of discrepancy.
_f levels computed on the basis of three most extreme
levels of discrepancy
^Significant beyond the .05 level, 2/54 df.
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in the film situation was only marginally significant (p<^.10).
As probability of acceptance seems to be underestimated at low
levels of discrepancy, f_ levels were recomputed on the basis of relative
change scores obtained at the three most extreme discrepancy levels. The
cue number by source and cue number by perceived expertise analyses of
variance discussed above were then conducted on these f^ levels. Only
the modified version employed by Ajzen and Sejwacz was used in these
analyses
.
If relative change estimates of p are more precise at more extreme
a
levels of discrepancy, then the effects of cue number and perceived
expertise should be heightened, at least in the student situation where
these variables had their clearest facilitative effects. As can be seen
in Table 6, a somewhat stronger student main effect of cue number was
obtained in the cue number by source analysis. This result was replicated
in the cue number by perceived expertise analysis as well. Moreover, a
significant main effect for perceived expertise was also obtained (F
2,54
= 3.268, p^.05). These t_ levels are displayed in Table 7. Thus, for
the student situation, deleting estimates of p at the .15 level of
discrepancy produced the expected main effects of cue number and per-
ceived expertise on the f^ parameter.
Turning to the film situation, the expected main effect of cue
number on these estimates of _f was not significant, although, as noted
in Table 6, the means are in the expected direction. However, as with
the original f_ values, a main effect of cue number may be more difficult
to achieve since the persuasive impact of amount of prior information
was relatively small.
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Goodness of fit
The preceeding analysis suggests that estimates of f based upon
relative change scores are somewhat insensitive to changes in facilitation.
Another method by which to determine the utility of employing relative
change scores as estimates of probability of acceptance is to determine
the degree to which obtained values of p^ (i.e. C/D) match those predicted
on the basis of the f levels computed across the four non-zero levels of
discrepancy. For each subject within each condition of each situation,
predicted values of p^ were computed at each non-zero level of discrepancy
using both Equations 5 and 6. For each equation, correlations between
postdicted and obtained values were computed, resulting in ten correla-
tions (one per subject) within each of the nine experimental groups of
each situation. Table 8 summarizes the results of this analysis,
averaged over subjects within each of the cue number-source subclasses.
As can be seen, the mean correlations vary greatly across cells, both
in the sign and magnitude. These results stand in sharp contrast to
those obtained by Ajzen and Sejwacz whose correlations were consistently
strongly positive.
Table 8
Average Intra-cell Correlations Between Predicted
and Obtained Values of Probability of Acceptance
Student Situation
Cue Number
Expertise 2 4 6
Low .158 .459 -.558
Medium .259 .018 .157
High .540 .436 .016
Film Situation
Cue Number
Expertise 2 4 6
Low .222 .402 .296
Medium .232 .814 .444
High -.104 -.067 .206
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Belief change
The effects of source discrepancy and amount of prior information
generally conformed to expectations. A significant main effect of dis-
crepancy and its interaction with amount of prior information were obtained.
While discrepancy and change were positively related, variations in amount
of prior information significantly affected the slope of this relation-
ship. This interaction also indicated that decreases in amount of prior
information had their greatest effects at more extreme levels of discrep-
ancy. This underscores the importance of taking into account level of
discrepancy in predicting the effects of facilitating factors on change.
The strength of the discrepancy main effect and the facilitative
effect of prior information were significantly weakened in the film
situation. Multiple regression analysis suggested that these weaker
effects were primarily due to the greater informaional value of the cues
in the film two-cue condition. That is, the overall facilitation level
associated with the initial proximal probabilities of the film two-cue
condition was lower than that of the student situation. Consequently,
film beliefs in this condition were more resistant to change.
The discrepancy by information interaction of the film situation
differed from the student situation in another way as well. As predicted,
increases in prior information produced, in the student situation, de-
creases in slope. However, in the film situation, the relationship
between information and slope approximated a U-shaped function. The
explanation of this latter result is open to speculation. One possibility.
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however, is suggested by the results of the multiple regression analysis
which indicated that subjects in the film six-cue condition focused upon
four cues in making their probabilistic judgments. Subjects in the student
six-cue condition primarily weighted only three. Perhaps, within the con-
text of this experiment at least, processing more than three cues was
relatively difficult. Indeed, researchers have found that the amount of
information individuals can process is limited (e.g. Miller, 1956). If
this line of reasoning is correct, the discrepancy by cue number inter-
action observed in the film situation may indicate that attempts to base
initial beliefs on too much information can be as facilitative of change
as attempting to form opinions when too little information is available.
The source manipulation failed to maintain large differences in
perceived expertise over the course of the experiment, with moderately
and highly expert sources suffering losses in perceived expertise.
Although no data were directly available, it seems reasonable to attribute
the loss of expertise to source discrepancy. That is, highly expert
sources suffered losses in expertise following their offering opinions
highly discrepant from those of the receivers. These changes in source
evaluation again indicate the importance of taking into account the
amount of advocated change when predicting acutal change.
In order to partially compensate for the inadequacy of the source
manipulation, subjects were categorized according to their post-exper-
imental ratings of perceived expertise. Consistent with expectation, a
discrepancy by perceived expertise interaction was obtained in the student
situation. However, the high and medium expertise sources did not sig-
nificantly differ in their persuasive impact. This may mean that increasos
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in perceived expertise do not necessarily imply increases in facilitation.
More interestingly, this result may instead imply that, just as the
difference between low and medium sources becomes clear only at extreme
levels of discrepancy, the differential persuasive effectiveness between
medium and high sources may become clear only at still more extreme
discrepancy levels. It should be remembered that the discrepancy levels
of this study were varied from 0 to .60 only. Future research manipulating
discrepancy at more extreme levels may be able to determine which of these
two hypotheses is correct.
Relative change and probability of acceptance
In general, relative change scores seem to be only a rough index of
probability of acceptance. Although significantly affecting change,
discrepancy, amount of prior information, and perceived expertise did not
consistently affect c/D in the expected manner. Estimates of f^ based
upon relative change scores also failed to conform to expectation. Finally,
average intracell correlations between ad hoc and obtained values of pSi
were often low and sometimes negative.
On the other hand, computations of f^ based upon relative change
scores at the three most extreme levels of discrepancy proved to be more
sensitive to changes in facilitation, at least in the student situation.
Taken together, these results may suggest that the relationship between
and C specified in Equation 3 holds only at more extreme levels of
discrepancy. Thus, although data obtained by Ajzen and Sejwacz support the
model of probability of acceptance and this study confirms the hypothesized
relationships between discrepancy, facilitation, and change, the relation-
ship between p„ and C evidently requires further specification.a
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Implications for change along other dimensions
Overall, the change data confirm Fishbein and Ajzen's contention
that changes in a receiver's corresponding belief depend upon the amount
of change advocated and initial levels of facilitation. It is important
to note however that change in the Fishbein-Ajzen model is conceptualized
as movement across a dimension of subjective probability. The emphasis
on belief change in the Fishbein-Ajzen model is understandable since these
authors view belief change as the foundation of changes in attitude,
intentions, and behavior. However, most research in the area of persuasive
communications has not been limited to this dimension. Moreover, unlike
the present study, most persuasive communication research employs argu-
ments which the experimenter intuitively feels support the conclusion of
the message. Unfortunately, as previously noted, no consistent effects
involving discrepancy along these other dimensions has been obtained.
To the extent that change along the more typical dimensions employed
by traditional researchers is analogous to change along the dimension of
subjective probability (an assumption which has yet to be tested), the
results of this study suggest that the inconsistent effects of discrep-
ancy in past research may be due to possible differences in initial
facilitation. These differences may be due to many factors. For example,
discrepancy and credibility would be expected to have little effect on
persuasion for issues about which subjects have much prior information.
Conceptualizing initial facilitation as being affected by the character-
istics of supportive arguments suggests that discrepancy and credibility
will have varying effects as supportive arguments vary in the degree to
which they produce changes in the corresponding beliefs of the receiver
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or are perceived to be supportive of the communicator's position.
Unfortunately, different studies tend to use different supportive
arguments without assessing possible differences in their persuasiveness.
Moreover, although a given study usually holds the content of the communi-
cation constant while varying the discrepancy of the communicator's position,
several experiments (Bochner and Insko, 1966; Brock, 1967; Eagly, 1974;
Rhine and Severance, 1970) have shown that the perceived supportiveness of
a given set of arguments may decrease with increases in discrepancy. In
these cases, increases in discrepancy may be associated with decreases
in initial facilitation, thereby clouding the relationship between dis-
crepancy per se and persuasion. It seems reasonable to suggest therefore
that consistent discrepancy effects will be obtained across various
dimensions only when it becomes possible to specify the initial levels of
facilitation associated with each persuasive attempt and the degree to
which these levels are affected by the use of different dimensions,
variations in supportive arguments, and changes in the position of the
communicator
.
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Appendix G
Profile
Levels of Each Cue Used in Each Profile of Each Situation
Student Situation
Cues Six Cues^
MEL ES AQHS GPA SAT MEL ES AQHS CPA NEA
F
I
R
S
T
S
E
T
S
E
T
Two Cues
MEL ES
1
2
3
4
7
2
6
?
H
1
3
oJ
J.
6
4
cJ
7
7
6
/
9
10
5
6
5
1
3
2
1
3
6
3
3
7
7
4
9
q
5
5
1
xu
6
4
6
i
9
2
4
2
2
35 H y 2 1 5 5 5 3 2 2 46 1X 7 1 4 5 7 1 8 5 9 4 27 1A. Q Q nO 4 2 9 8 7 3 6 28 J 9 z c 9 1 6 5 6 3 1 29 o 1X o 1 9 4 1 3 6 2 5 110 1X J Z. cD 7 2 3 2 3 6 2 111 1X cJ 1 rO 5 3 4 7 3 4 5 912 A\J *+ 7 oi. 9 7 2 6 3 8 4 513 'i 1X D 7 2 4 4 6 6 2 114 fi £o 0 A 3 6 2 8 7 2 8 315 J 7 oO y 0 2 8 9 2 8 6 3
16 &D Qy cJ 1X 7 1 5 3 9 8 4
17 1 3 2 J 7 3 2 3 6 2 1
18 4 2 1 5 6 6 6 1 2 8 5 1
19 7 6 1 6 4 8 1 4 7 7 8 7
20 2 1 6 7 10 1 3 7 9 10 1 2
21 6 5 1 8 6 2 8 1 5 3 6 8
22 8 1 7 3 1 1 6 1 3 6 2 9
23 3 2 2 5 9 1 6 5 6 3 1 2
24 5 4 5 7 4 9 6 3 9 4 5 7
25 3 7 3 4 5 8 2 2 2 9 7 1
26 2 3 5 4 6 2 3 4 5 4 2 3
27 9 2 1 6 3 9 9 9 5 4 7 8
28 8 3 3 8 9 3 3 6 8 6 8 4
29 5 8 7 8 9 7 8 6 2 5 4 9
30 3 1 4 6 7 2 4 4 6 6 2 1
*Note: SAT = Scholastic Aptitude Test scores
MEL = Mother's Educational Level
ES = Economic Status of student
AQHS= Academic Quality of High School
GPA = Grade Point Average
NEA = Number of Extracurricular Activities
^The following pairs of profiles are identical: 2, 20; 4, 26; 8, 23;
10, 17; and 13, 30.
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Film Situation
Two Cues Four Cues
Prnf 1
1
t 1. Ui. XJ.C rC AAS PC SD AAS AV PC
1
£, 3 1 6 3 8 2
o QO 10 9 10 8 9 8
•JJ OC c0 1 9 8 8 5Q oo 9 8 10 8 11
T t;i J 1 2 4 1 4 6 3
tv D Qo 9 1 4 5 1 1
7 cJ 7 6 6 9 1 2T ft1 O lU 9 8 9 8 7 9
9 6 2 3 1 6 8 6
S 10 8 11 8 10 9 7 10
5 9 2 5 3 6 11
1 IZ QO 1 3 8 5 2 5
1 TIJ 9 10 7 9 10 6 9
1 /
9 9 2 4 2 1
5 3 8 2 6 5 8
1 A10 7 0 2 8 4 9 2
1 71 / Qo 11 8 10 9 7 10
D lO cJ 4 4 2 7 4 7
I? 1 Q£. ly cJ 1 2 5 9 4 6
Qo 10 9 10 8 9 8
n 91 J 08 3 5 1 2 5
3 08 8 7 2 9
9 08 9 8 7 9
9AZH gO J I 7 3 5 8
S 25 4 2 4 8 7 8 3
E 26 9 8 9 8 10 8 11
T 27 8 2 1 8 3 1 2
28 2 4 8 6 3 8 1
29 3 9 5 9 9 3 10
30 9 10 7 9 10 6 9
'Note: PC = Production Costs
PSA = Popularity of the Starring Actor
SD - Skill of the Director
AAS = Acting Ability of the Star
NFR = Number of Favorable Reviews
AV = Amount of Violence
Six Cues^
PSA SD AAS NFR i\ V
3 6 3 2
11 10 9 10 «0
1 2 7 1
10 9 10 9 7
9 9 2 7 1
6 1 8 6 8
11 4 10 3 5
8 11 8 8 q
9 9 3 5 8
11 9 11 9 5
4 11 5 11 9
7 9 4 1 1
10 11 9 10 5
2 3 5 11 8
3 7 1 3 2
7 5 6 2 3
11 9 11 9 6
5 7 2 3 2
2 9 8 9 3
11 10 9 10 8
8 6 8 8 2
4 9 9 2 1
8 11 8 8 9
7 1 9 4 7
1 7 7 4 3
10 9 10 9 7
4 5 3 2 4
3 1 4 3 5
3 9 2 8 2
10 11 9 10 6
'The following pairs of profiles are identical: 2, 20; 4, 26; 8, 23;
10, 17; and 13, 30.

